» » Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA

Download Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA fb2

by Anne Cahn
Download Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA fb2
Politics & Government
  • Author:
    Anne Cahn
  • ISBN:
    0271017902
  • ISBN13:
    978-0271017907
  • Genre:
  • Publisher:
    Penn State University Press (August 21, 1998)
  • Pages:
    246 pages
  • Subcategory:
    Politics & Government
  • Language:
  • FB2 format
    1519 kb
  • ePUB format
    1558 kb
  • DJVU format
    1509 kb
  • Rating:
    4.4
  • Votes:
    141
  • Formats:
    rtf docx lit doc


The Right Attacks the CIA. Anne Hessing Cahn.

The Right Attacks the CIA. The Pennsylvania State University Press. University Park, Pennsylvania. This book addresses how the intelligence community and outsiders assessed the threat from the Soviet Union during the rise and fall of detente in the 1970s and how those assessments affected its demise. Chapter 1 sets the stage by examining the heyday of detente in the mid-1970s. This was a time of great hope for the majority of Americans and of great fear for cold warriors.

Cahn, Anne Hessing Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA University Park, PA: Penn State University Press 232 . In chapter 1 Cahn explains the importance of Albert Wohlstetter to the detente opponents

Cahn, Anne Hessing Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA University Park, PA: Penn State University Press 232 p. $ 3. 0 cloth, $ 1. 5 paper ISBN 0-271-01790-2 cloth ISBN 0-271-01791-0 paper Publication Date: October 1998. In chapter 1 Cahn explains the importance of Albert Wohlstetter to the detente opponents.

Cahn, Anne Hessing Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA .

Cahn, Anne Hessing Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA University Park, PA: Penn State University Press 232 p. The basic thesis of Killing Detente is that a group of conservative ideologues worked deliberately throughout the 1970s to undermine the . policy of detente with the Soviet Union. The book is divided into nine chapters and also includes an appendix, a glossary, an index, and an extensive bibliography.

Home Browse Books Book details, Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CI.

Home Browse Books Book details, Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA. Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA. By Anne Hessing Cahn. In the mid-1970s a very controversial intelligence estimate was performed by people outside the government.

On this site it is impossible to download the book, read the book online or get the contents of a book. The administration of the site is not responsible for the content of the site. The data of catalog based on open source database. All rights are reserved by their owners. Download book Killing detente : the right attacks the CIA, Anne Hessing Cahn.

Killing Detente book. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Start by marking Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read.

Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA. In 1976, another group of outside experts sounded an alarm about the Soviet threat. But she bites her lip through enough of the book to provide a straightforward narrative of the controversy and the maneuvers that produced Team B. The real and gnawing uncertainties at the time about Soviet capabilities and intentions do not, however, evoke her sympathy, or comprehension. Team B did not kill detente, which was already dead by the time the report appeared at the end of 1976. April 03, 2000. Summary: History of the Nuclear Age Series. Related Media and Tools. About the Nuclear Policy Program. The Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program works to strengthen international security by diagnosing acute nuclear risks, informing debates on solutions, and engaging international actors to effect change. The program’s work spans deterrence, disarmament, nonproliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear energy.

Killing Detente tells the story of a major episode of intelligence intervention in politics in the mid-1970s that led to the derailing of detente between the Soviet. Cahn unearthed lots of formerly classified documents. Recently Viewed and Featured

Killing Detente tells the story of a major episode of intelligence intervention in politics in the mid-1970s that led to the derailing of detente between the Soviet. Recently Viewed and Featured. Jacob's Rescue: A Holocaust Story.

Killing Detente tells the story of a major episode of intelligence intervention in politics in. .Charging the CIA this way seems preposterous now.

Killing Detente tells the story of a major episode of intelligence intervention in politics in the mid-1970s that led to the derailing of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States and to the resurgence of the Cold War in the following decade. Nonfiction Politics.

Killing Detente tells the story of a major episode of intelligence intervention in politics in the mid-1970s that led to the derailing of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States and to the resurgence of the Cold War in the following decade. Although the basic outlines of the story are already known, Anne Cahn succeeded in getting many previously declassified documents released and uses these, supplemented by seventy interviews with principal players, to add much greater depth and detail to our understanding of this troubling event in U. S. history.

In the mid-1970s a very controversial intelligence estimate was performed by people outside the government. They were given access to our most secret files and leaked their report to the press when Jimmy Carter was elected president. This study, which became known as "The Team B Report," became the intellectual forbearer of the "window of vulnerability" and led to the demise of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States. Team B was the fundamental turning point in renewing the Cold War in the 1980s. The debate over the leaked report moved the center of arms control policy strongly to the right from where it had been during the years of detente. Team B presaged the triumph of Ronald Reagan and a military buildup on a scale unprecedented in peacetime that left present and future generations with the most crippling debt in our nation’s history. This book is about attempts to destroy improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Those opposed to the easing of tensions between the two countries used every means available, including accusing the Central Intelligence Agency of understating the threat posed by the Soviets. Charging the CIA this way seems preposterous now.


Bys
Excellent account of inner rivalry between government agencies and mechanics of threat inflation, that spurred the arms race in the 1970's, helped the neoconservative cause, and eventually led to the election of Ronald Reagan.
Nirn
Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA; Review; book reviews

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January, 1999

No. 1, Vol. 55; Pg. 70

Warnke, Paul C.

Killing Detente is a highly readable account of an ill-considered and maladroit exercise in intelligence reassessment that delayed--but did not derail--detente, the process of accommodation that occurred between Washington and Moscow in the mid-1970s.

In presenting her analysis of what became known as the Team B exercise, Anne Cahn uses her extensive experience in international affairs, a careful review of many previously unavailable documents, and interviews with key individuals involved in the affair. (I should disclose that I worked with the author at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Committee on National Security, and reviewed drafts of some chapters of her book.)

Shortly after Gerald Ford succeeded Richard Nixon, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) began to push for an alternative review of Soviet strategic capabilities, contending that the National Intelligence Estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) might be understating Soviet strategic strength. Competent analysts, however, had criticized the CIA's reports as greatly overstating Soviet military expenditures.

In late 1975, then-CIA Director William Colby responded negatively to the PFIAB proposal and disagreed with its contention that the agency's intelligence estimates erred by "projecting a sense of complacency." But President Ford, engaged as he was with Ronald Reagan's challenge for the 1976 Republican presidential nomination, was sensitive to possible fight-wing criticism. He eventually authorized the Team B adventure.

The initial idea was to appoint three panels of outside experts that would assess, respectively, the threat to U.S. ICBM survival created by Soviet missile accuracy, the Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability against U.S. nuclear missile submarines, and the extent to which Soviet air defenses could prevent penetration by strategic bombers.

The navy, however, considered information about the operational aspects of submarine patrols and whether they might be trailed by Soviet assets as information that could not be shared, even with the CIA. The second panel, accordingly, was reoriented to deal with Soviet strategic objectives. It is the work of this panel that is generally referred to as the Team B Report.

Whatever might be said for evaluation of strategic capabilities by a group of outside experts, the impracticality of achieving useful results by "independent" analysis of strategic objectives should have been self-evident. Moreover, the futility of the Team B enterprise was assured by the selection of the panel's members. Rather than including a diversity of views, as was recently done in putting together the, so-called Rumsfeld Commission on the ballistic missile threat, the Strategic Objectives Panel was composed entirely of individuals who had made careers of viewing the Soviet menace with alarm.

As the author notes, the panel's chairman, Richard Pipes, has been called the "intellectual godfather" of the thesis that the Soviets had rejected nuclear parity and were bent on fighting a nuclear war. In an interview, Pipes told Cahn that he wrote most of the first section of the report, which criticized the CIA for underestimating the "intensity, scope, and implicit threat" posed by the Soviet Union, by using evidence relating to capabilities rather than intentions. This section argued that the really important evidence demonstrated that "Soviet leaders are first and foremost offensively rather than defensively minded."

It is now entirely clear, however, that by the early 1970s Soviet leaders had concluded that the Soviet Union could not win, and might not even survive, a nuclear war. Anyone thereafter dealing with Soviet officials could readily recognize that they held no illusions about having military superiority over the United States and its allies. They were completely aware that NATO was a security alliance with a solidarity and common purpose that could not be ascribed to the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. Even the dullest of Soviet leaders must have known that a limited nuclear war would almost certainly have meant the destruction of the Kremlin--and thus of the Soviet empire.

Detente was not doing too well when Team B met in 1975. It had been badly damaged by the U.S.-Soviet confrontation precipitated in 1973 by the Israeli-Egyptian war. In October of that year, the encirclement of Egypt's Third Army by Israeli defense forces prompted Leonid Brezhnev to call for joint U.S.-Soviet intervention to stop the fighting. Otherwise, suggested the Soviet premier, the Soviet Union might consider acting alone. In response to this muted threat, the United States called a worldwide alert of both its conventional and nuclear forces.

Although the crisis soon passed, it cast a continuing chill on the dialogue between Washington and Moscow. The Team B Report was a further blow to detente and, as the author observes, it provided "intellectual fodder" for the Committee on the Present Danger, which was spearheaded by former Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow. In its first policy statement, released two days after the 1976 presidential election, the committee stated that "the principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup." The Soviet Union, the committee concluded, "has not altered its long-held goal of a world dominated fromz a single center--Moscow."

Not surprisingly, the founding board members of the Committee on the Present Danger included Team B members Richard Pipes, Foy Kohler, Paul Nitze, and William Van Cleave. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, Pipes was named the president's special adviser on the Soviet Union and, in a masterpiece of miscasting, Eugene Rostow, the motivating force behind the Committee on the Present Danger, became director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Fortunately, Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power and the rapport he developed with Ronald Reagan, beginning with their first meeting in Geneva in 1985, put an end to superpower confrontation politics and, in a few years, to the Soviet Union itself. In the interest of fairness, I must note that Team B member Paul Nitze played a constructive role in that process as arms control adviser to Secretary of State George Shultz.

Although detente in the long run survived the right-wing attack, the painful consequences of the Team B affair can still be felt in the diversion of massive funds from genuine human needs to a grossly excessive U.S. military buildup.

Cahn voices warm appreciation for the legal work that gave her access to previously undisclosed documents through the Freedom of Information Act. But it

is the author's thoughtful analysis of these documents and her searching interviews with key players that give Killing Detente its scope and depth.

Previously we knew little about the Team B Strategic Objectives Panel apart from its report. We now know that the way its members were selected and the manner in which it operated virtually preordained its conclusions. Not only is Anne Cahn's book of historical interest and useful as a teaching tool, but it is also a valuable study of how not to set defense policy.

Paul C. Warnke, a lawyer in Washington, D.C., was director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief arms negotiator in the Carter administration, and assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Johnson administration.

Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA; Review; book review Perspectives on Political Science June 22, 1999

Perspectives on Political Science

June 22, 1999

No. 3, Vol. 28; Pg. 164

THOMAS, STAFFORD T.

Cahn, Anne Hessing Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA University Park, PA: Penn State University Press 232 pp., $ 35.00 cloth, $ 17.95 paper ISBN 0-271-01790-2 cloth ISBN 0-271-01791-0 paper Publication Date: October 1998

The basic thesis of Killing Detente is that a group of conservative ideologues worked deliberately throughout the 1970s to undermine the U.S. policy of detente with the Soviet Union. The main focus of their efforts was the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) of Soviet military, nuclear, and strategic capabilities and intentions, which are produced by the U.S. intelligence community, especially the Central Intelligence Agency. The group sought to diminish the credibility of the NIEs and to substitute their views of the Soviet threat to influence U.S. foreign and national security policy. Author Anne Hessing Cahn, a scholar in residence at American University, has worked at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Committee for National Security.

The book is divided into nine chapters and also includes an appendix, a glossary, an index, and an extensive bibliography. The bibliography lists fourteen interviews with key figures and numerous documents secured under the Freedom of Information Act.

In chapter 1 Cahn explains the importance of Albert Wohlstetter to the detente opponents. In chapter 2 she reviews the domestic and international factors that contributed to their "loose coalition," including a wide array of individuals and groups, some of whom were not politically conservative but had other reasons to oppose detente. In chapter 3 Cahn describes aspects of the international setting in the early 1970s that favored the coalition: confusion about the meaning of detente, Soviet opportunism (especially in the Third World), perceptions of U.S. diplomatic failures in the Helsinki and Vladivostok negotiations, and concerns about Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. In chapters 4 and 5 Cahn discusses the NIE process, the substance of NIEs in the early 1970s, and how the NIEs became the conduit for "conservative" attempts to sabotage detente. Chapter 6 describes the role of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which ostensibly reviewed intelligence policy and performance but became the tool of the detente opponents in their effort to undermine the CIA and the NIEs.

Chapters 7, 8, and 9 are devoted to "Team B," a group of nonintelligence Soviet experts who used the same data as the NIE analysts but reached different conclusions. Cahn discusses three reasons for the creation of Team B and the membership and formation of the three Team B groups. She contrasts the alarming Team B results with the more reassuring NIEs on the Soviet threat. An epilogue summarizes her arguments.

The book will appeal to scholars and general readers interested in a detailed history of national estimates. Its view of the Team B episode is based on material not available elsewhere. The book is polemical at times but persuasive. It is perhaps best read together with John Prados's The Soviet Estimate and Roy Godson's Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates.

The United States Foreign Affairs

May, 1999 / June, 1999

Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA. BY ANNE HESSING CAHN. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998, 232 pp. $ 35.00.

In 1976, another group of outside experts sounded an alarm about the Soviet threat. (Once again Paul Nitze was there, although historian Richard Pipes was more influential.) Known as Team B, its goal was to critique the official intelligence estimates (those of "Team A"). Cahn is angry, since she views detente as "a time of great hope for the majority of Americans and of great fear for Cold Warriors." But she bites her lip through enough of the book to provide a straightforward narrative of the controversy and the maneuvers that produced Team B. The real and gnawing uncertainties at the time about Soviet capabilities and intentions do not, however, evoke her sympathy, or comprehension. Team B did not kill detente, which was already dead by the time the report appeared at the end of 1976. In another echo of the Gaither Committee, however, Team B had its greatest effect by coalescing the worldview of like-minded neoconservatives who later so strongly influenced the early Reagan administration.
Enone
Sadat and the Syrians officially informed Moscow about their intention to strike at Israel and they take, this time, the initiative to attack.

The signatories of Détente saw this as a mere prelude to a political solution. The Russians and the Americans knew the Arabs did not want to destroy Israel, nor were they capable of doing so; they simply wanted to break the stalemate that was ending in a deadlock and lasted for a long time. The situation had become intolerable since the end of the Six Days war of 1967. Six years later, the Arabs, independently and without USSR's energetic guidance, realized that without some shock treatment neither the Israeli nor the Americans would be willing to move and find a settlement (instead of a solution) to this deadlock.

Sadat's presentation almost certainly met with Soviet approval. Day by day the local media assured the Arabs that Soviet leaders had often stressed the necessity of a just and fair political solution to the conflict. Nobody ever wrote about a just and fair settlement of the conflict that started from the beginning of the twentieth century.

Brezhnev gave a speech at Alma-Ata that can rightfully be regarded as a roadmap. He concluded the following among the most urgent tasks the USSR had to discuss with friends ""The achievement of a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the declaration of U.N. Security Council and General Assembly that provides for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab lands"" . The Arab Left saw this was the Communist Party line and the statement was reiterated in many speeches and articles up to the outbreak of the 1973 war. Arab radios repeatedly voiced Soviet leaders that it was unacceptable to acquire territory by force - unless of course the country in question happened to be a superpower such as the Soviet Union.

In 1971, within the context of `détente', USA and USSR signed agreement to sell $ 136 million wheat and $ 125 million drilling equipment to Russia i.e. to export surplus American wheat to USSR. In return, Brezhnev agreed to help Nixon push North Vietnam to negotiate end of the war and Nixon began trade with Russia, sale of wheat, Siberian Gas investment. (Just a marginal observation in this context: Senator Henry Jackson led passage of Jackson-Vanik amendment to withhold most favored nation status until Russia allowed unlimited Jewish emigration and guaranteed human rights)

So,and still within the context of detente, when the Arab Oil Producers decided at their meeting in September 1973 to use the Oil weapon, Pravda encouraged them and expressed hope that oil warfare would escalate. The Arabs Right (then labeled ""Reactionaries"" by their `'brothers" of the Left, saw this as a venue for Moscow to benefit from any consequential increase in the price of Oil). In fact the Soviets were then suffering from severe shortage of wheat. The price of bread was much below the cost of the wheat used to produce it. Russia simply subsidized the cost of wheat that, in some cases, farmers fed their livestock bread rather than grain because bread cost them less. (Just another marginal observation of how detente, supported by Corporate America, is faring these days: Today, with the price of Oil soaring to $ 100+ Russia is able to benefit up to One billion American Dollars per day - yes per day. Russia has settled all her outstanding debts and is in positive cash flow)

Too much `blessings' from Détente.
Honeirsil
How in the heck was it possible for anyone in the late 90s to grieve for the passing of detente? Patriots were glad to have won the Cold War, and progressives were crushed over the collapse of international socialism. But detente? That dishonorable hodgepodge of political expedience and moral equivalence?
The author seems to think that the Soviet Union's decline and fall was obvious and common knowledge, and the right-wingers agitating for the administration not to be snookered by the Soviets' peace offensive were out of line. So, therefore the military buildup in the late Carter and early Reagan years was unnecessary, because the money could have been spent on various liberal social programs. It's a case of "yes, he saved the patient, but the _way_ he did it was wrong". And she apparently doesn't care that all the liberal social programs got enacted anyway, at the cost of a balanced budget in the Eighties.
And she calls Solzhenitsyn's brave witness against the Gulag "inflammatory". Sheesh! What a weird book...
Buridora
Unfortunately for readers who were not alive at the height of detente, this book offers little explanation of the KGB's primary motive for engaging detente; the hope of exploiting intelligence collection opportunities against the U.S. and its allies. Numerous former KGB agents have revealed the Soviets true intent at the very beginning of detente. Subsequent efforts by U.S. agencies to end detente were born of a very serious threat to U.S. national security. Place the blame squarely where it belongs - in the lap of the KGB.