» » The Self and its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Toronto Studies in Philosophy)

Download The Self and its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Toronto Studies in Philosophy) fb2

by John Russon
Download The Self and its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Toronto Studies in Philosophy) fb2
Philosophy
  • Author:
    John Russon
  • ISBN:
    0802009190
  • ISBN13:
    978-0802009197
  • Genre:
  • Publisher:
    University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division; 1 edition (August 21, 1997)
  • Pages:
    216 pages
  • Subcategory:
    Philosophy
  • Language:
  • FB2 format
    1601 kb
  • ePUB format
    1684 kb
  • DJVU format
    1860 kb
  • Rating:
    4.5
  • Votes:
    791
  • Formats:
    azw rtf lit lrf


A major criticism of Hegel's philosophy is that it fails to comprehend the experience of the body.

A major criticism of Hegel's philosophy is that it fails to comprehend the experience of the body. Russson's book is nothing less than a re-organization of the Phenomenology of Spirit, one that makes explicit the conceptual commitment to embodiment that may have been concealed from many readers. This re-organization is accomplished with an all-too-rare philosophical sophistication, as Russon draws on a variety of sources and informs his reading with a strong command of 20th century phenomenology.

Although Russon approaches Hegel's Phenomenology from a contemporary standpoint, he. .Series: Toronto Studies in Philosophy.

Although Russon approaches Hegel's Phenomenology from a contemporary standpoint, he places both this standpoint and Hegel's work within a classical tradition. Using the Aristotelian terms of 'nature' and 'habit,' Russon refers to the classical distinction between biological nature and a cultural 'second nature. It is this second nature that constitutes, in Russon's reading of Hegel, the true embodiment of human intersubjectivity. In this book, John Russon shows that there is in fact a philosophy of embodiment implicit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.

John Russon (born 1960) is a Canadian philosopher, working . The Self and Its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). ISBN 978-0-8020-8482-8.

John Russon (born 1960) is a Canadian philosopher, working primarily in the tradition of Continental Philosophy. In 2006, he was named Presidential Distinguished Professor at the University of Guelph, and in 2011 he was the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute's Canadian Lecturer to India. Russon is also known as a scholar of ancient philosophy, especially for his use of the methods of 20th Century European philosophy (phenomenology, hermeneutics and deconstruction) to interpret the texts of Plato and Aristotle. In this book, John Russon shows that there is in fact a philosophy of embodiment implicit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

A major criticism of Hegel's philosophy is that it fails to comprehend the experience of the body.

Hegel and the phenomenology of the family .

Hegel and the phenomenology of the family /. David V. Ciavatta.

Any study of Hegel’s philosophy of self-consciousness must focus on what he calls the ‘Unhappy Consciousness,’ which Jean Hyppolite, one of the best interpreters of Hegel, rightly identifies as the fundamental theme of thePhenomenology of Spirit.

In this book, John Russon shows that there is in fact a philosophy of embodiment implicit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

In this book, John Russon shows that there is in fact a philosophy of embodiment implicit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.

Similar books and articles. Russon, John Temporality and the Future of Philosophy in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Religion and Demythologization in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Temporality and the Future of Philosophy in Hegel’s Phenomenology. John Russon - 2008 - International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):59-68. John Edward Russon - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada). Thomas A. Lewis - 2008 - In Dean Moyar & Michael Quante (ed., Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. Midwifery' and Criticism in G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.

A major criticism of Hegel's philosophy is that it fails to comprehend the experience of the body. In this book, John Russon shows that there is in fact a philosophy of embodiment implicit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Russon argues that Hegel has not only taken account of the body, but has done so in a way that integrates both modern work on embodiment and the approach to the body found in ancient Greek philosophy.

Although Russon approaches Hegel's Phenomenology from a contemporary standpoint, he places both this standpoint and Hegel's work within a classical tradition. Using the Aristotelian terms of 'nature' and 'habit,' Russon refers to the classical distinction between biological nature and a cultural 'second nature.' It is this second nature that constitutes, in Russon's reading of Hegel, the true embodiment of human intersubjectivity. The development of spirit, as mapped out by Hegel, is interpreted here as a process by which the self establishes for itself an embodiment in a set of social and political institutions in which it can recognize and satisfy its rational needs. Russon concludes by arguing that self-expression and self-interpretation are the ultimate needs of the human spirit, and that it is the degree to which these needs are satisfied that is the ultimate measure of the adequacy of the institutions that embody human life.

This link with classicism - in itself a serious contribution to the history of philosophy -provides an excellent point of access into the Hegelian system. Russon's work, which will prove interesting reading for any Hegel scholar, provides a solid and reliable introduction to the study of Hegel.


Sironynyr
John Russon's ambitious aim in this book is twofold: (1) to identify the conception of the body that is implied by the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and (2) to provide a systematic argument that shows this conception of the body to be both comprehensive and compelling. Not only does the book make a good case for having succeeded in these aims, it also provides material for a very careful and provocative reinterpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology that should prove readable and insightful for both general readers with interests in the history of philosophy as well as trained philosophers.
Russon shows that the body that animates the forms of experience that Hegel studies in his text cannot be adequately conceived as reducible to the merely physical organism. In an important early chapter, Russon gives an account of the systematic way in which Hegel's philosophy challenges and overcomes the dualism of immaterial mind and physical body that stands at the heart of early modern philosophy and science. He argues that the body as we experience it is not merely a natural entity (physis), but is a construct of habit and institutions; our experience of the body is not one merely of nature, but of second nature, as Aristotle described the habitual formation of social dispositions (hexis). The final chapters of the text aim to show, moreover, that this "habit-body" should be conceived ultimately as emerging through communicative activity (logos), and that the ongoing process whereby we (non-arbitrarily) constitute ourselves and our world along with others is precisely what is thematized in Hegel's dialectical phenomenology.
Considering the difficulty of the topic, and the vast resources that the argument draws upon, the text is remarkably clear (and concise, at just 137 pages). You need not have spent several years poring over the details of Hegel's challenging and dense text in order to gain much benefit from reading Russon's book. In addition, the book has the merit of demonstrating (against a number of prejudices from a number of sources) that Hegel's philosophy can be a rich resource for thinking through a number of topics of contemporary concern. Russon's conclusions in fact converge nicely with recent efforts in a number of disciplines to draw attention to the embodied character of experience, cognition, and culture.
Blacknight
I highly recommend John Russon's _The Self and its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit_ to anyone with a philosophical interest in Hegel or the body: 1) It gives a compelling account of how Hegel would have to conceive body, and thus gives a new understanding of just what Hegel's phenomenology of spirit is concerned with, and what our bodies are. The latter is of central concern in much recent philosophy, and in everyday life in our political and technological culture. 2) It gives a lucid and convincing interpretation of Hegel's difficult book, one that proceeds through an engagement with historical positions in philosophy and science, and more important, through an engagement with the experience of trying to act responsibly in a situation, which experience haunts philosophy from the very beginning and is a most familiar element of life. Russon thus gets to the heart of Hegel's philosophy in a way that is illuminating for both the novice and the dedicated student of Hegel. And he thereby arrives at an important understanding of the body as that sphere of communicative and expressive existence which develops itself so as to enable responsible action in the first place. 3) The book's situation of Hegel in relation to ancient philosophy, transcendental argument and recent phenomenology invites a renewed engagement with Hegel, which is important given the role of Hegel in many current philosophical debates. In particular, Russon's discussion of the body and the unfolding of the Phenomenology of Spirit in terms of phusis (nature), hexis (habit) and logos (here meaning "expression") gives a very comprehensive and original way of grasping both the body and the Phenomenology. Likewise, his interpretation of Hegel's dialectic in terms of the relation of the empirical ego and transcendental ego and focus on recognition help clarify many crucial themes in Hegel. In general, Russon's elucidation of a concept of body in Hegel opens rich ways of thinking about our selves and our bodies.
Qane
Russson's book is nothing less than a re-organization of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, one that makes explicit the conceptual commitment to embodiment that may have been concealed from many readers. This re-organization is accomplished with an all-too-rare philosophical sophistication, as Russon draws on a variety of sources and informs his reading with a strong command of 20th century phenomenology.
Among the book's strengths is a startlingly lucid and original reading of Hegel's text, a reading that illuminates many familiar passages and arguments in striking fashion. Russon's account of the master and slave, and his account of Sittlichkeit, re-animate texts often thought to have been exhaustively understood, revealing both the richness of Hegel's text and the power of a serious reader like Russon. But Russon is also adept at uncovering new insights in passages under-represented in the literature, and it is perhaps here that this book makes one of its strongest contributions. Russon on the reason chapter, and on the unhappy consciousness (the analysis of which is one of his central arguments), provides original and compelling arguments for the centrality of embodiment to the Hegelian understanding of self-consciousness.
But arguably the most significant contribution made by this book is that it reminds us that a Hegelian argument can and should be a philosophical argument. Rather than limiting himself to contributing to ongoing debates within Hegel circles, Russon has engaged philosophical inquiry itself, and shown how Hegel's text, at the hands of a keen reader, can speak, indeed argue successfully, to the broader philosophical community. This book is an argument for the complete understanding of phases of embodiment as conditions of self-consciousness, and thereby an argument that brings phenomenology and Hegel into the centre of important contemporary discussions.