- Author:William Ratliff,Roger Fontaine
- Publisher:Hoover Institution Press; 1st edition (February 25, 2000)
- Pages:76 pages
- Subcategory:Social Sciences
- FB2 format1354 kb
- ePUB format1676 kb
- DJVU format1226 kb
- Formats:txt mobi docx lrf
by William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine.
national security affairs in Latin America as a member of the National Security Council from 1981 through 1983 during the Reagan presidency. by William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine.
The divisions over Cuba policy have never been as simple as is often portrayed. Now the conservative Hoover Institution has published a policy essay making a powerful case for a unilateral lifting of the embargo. Not all who oppose the embargo are left-wing Castro apologists, and not all who favor strengthening it are right-wing ideologues. The authors, veteran Latin America watchers and staunch conservatives, maintain that the Elián González case demonstrates the inevitable consequences of a Cuba policy that is both needlessly confrontational and wholly ineffective.
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Start by marking A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read. Worse yet, in the post–cold war world the policy and political outlook that sustain it have become a strategic liability. They promote conflict, both within Cuba-where a crisis might draw in the . military-and abroad, as occurred in 1999–2000 after the arrival in Florida of the rafter boy, Elián González. They allow pressure groups to stand in the way of the policy-making process of the .
Alarcón took over the office of President of the National Assembly of People's Power in 1993 in what Ben Corbett, a historian, considered a "demotion" from his earlier post as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
ISBN 13: 9780817943523.
A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba Call Number: HF 1500.
A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 2000. Call Number: HF 1500. U5 R37 2000 Essays in public policy, no. 100. Zhang, Shuguang. Economic Cold War America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001. ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER Additional Related Bibliographies 22 Joint Forces Staff College – Ike Skelton Library Ò www.
Find nearly any book by William Ratliff. A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba (Essays in Public Policy): ISBN 9780817943523 (978-0-8179-4352-3) Softcover, Hoover Institution Press, 2000
Find nearly any book by William Ratliff. Get the best deal by comparing prices from over 100,000 booksellers. A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba (Essays in Public Policy): ISBN 9780817943523 (978-0-8179-4352-3) Softcover, Hoover Institution Press, 2000. Vietnam Rising: Culture and Change in Asia's Tiger Cub. by William Ratliff. ^ Lewis, Paul (8 September 1994). World Heritage Encyclopedia is a registered trademark of the World Public Library Association, a non-profit organization. Cuban Talks Suspended As Envoy Returns to Havana". Golden, Tim (9 September 1994). Cuba, in Shift, Says Deal Can Be Reached With the . Golden, Tim (22 September 1994). Cuban Official Criticizes Lag By the . 3. The policy choice between economic sanctions and military coercion crosscuts the theoretical divide in international relations theory between liberal institutionalism and realism, which is about actors, not instruments. Whereas liberals see collective institutions as the critical actors in international politics, realists focus on self-seeking behavior by individual states.
A strategic flip-flop in the Caribbean. Law and economics in developing countries. Cuba, Developing countries, Entwicklungsländer, United States.
For almost three decades the U.S. embargo of Cuba was part of America's cold war strategy against the Soviet bloc. It should have been lifted after that ‘‘war’’ ended since Castro ceased to threaten the United States and its neighbors and adopted the standard rules of international behavior. But inertia, a powerful Cuban American lobby, and misguided politicians set new demands: democracy, improved human rights, and economic reform. When Castro demurred we tightened the sanctions in 1992 and again in 1996 with the Helms-Burton Law. The United States has never committed the resources necessary to overthrow Castro, however, and the pressures we have applied have utterly failed to advance the three objectives. Worse yet, in the post–cold war world the policy and political outlook that sustain it have become a strategic liability. They promote conflict, both within Cuba—where a crisis might draw in the U.S. military—and abroad, as occurred in 1999–2000 after the arrival in Florida of the rafter boy, Elián González.
They allow pressure groups to stand in the way of the policy-making process of the U.S. government. For example, the lobby manipulated wishy-washy politicians in 1998–1999 and got the president to turn down a widely supported proposal for a bipartisan commission to conduct the first comprehensive evaluation of the policy in four decades. Finally, the imperialistic Helms-Burton Law alienates allies worldwide and will poison relations between the United States and Cuba for decades to come. Castro will benefit no matter what we do, but on balance he gains more if we maintain the sanctions because they provide a scapegoat for his own repression and economic failures even as they enable him to maintain his cherished global image as the ‘‘scourge of U.S. imperialism.’’ Castro can wage a worldwide campaign against the embargo to bolster his image knowing Washington is too inflexible to change it. Indeed, whenever Washington has lightened up, Castro has tightened up and effectively prevented further improvement. Lifting sanctions need not mean establishing friendly relations with Castro—which he would reject in any event—or supporting his efforts to get international aid without meeting standard requirements. The ultimate responsibility for maintaining this antiquated and potentially dangerous policy falls on politicians who either do not understand the need for, or for political reasons are afraid to support, a new policy to benefit both Americans and Cubans in the post–cold war world.