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by James H. Cox
Download Reviewing Delegation: An Analysis of the Congressional Reauthorization Process fb2
Social Sciences
  • Author:
    James H. Cox
  • ISBN:
    0275978524
  • ISBN13:
    978-0275978525
  • Genre:
  • Publisher:
    Praeger (April 30, 2004)
  • Pages:
    176 pages
  • Subcategory:
    Social Sciences
  • Language:
  • FB2 format
    1976 kb
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    1821 kb
  • DJVU format
    1925 kb
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    4.5
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    319
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Theoretically, this tool allows Congress to prevent the president and the federal bureaucracy from drifting away from the original intent of legislation.

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by James H. Cox. Published April 30, 2004 by Praeger Publishers.

104–121) and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on March 29, 1996.

Members of Congress often delegate power to bureaucratic experts, but they fear losing permanent control of the policy.

23 James majority of congressional seats in the 2006 elections in the . Therefore, who holds power is, undeniably, influences policy preferences.

majority of congressional seats in the 2006 elections in the . However, each of these three streams is not enough to explain poli-cy process in MS framework. Three streams normally function indepen-dently, but should be coupled, according to Kingdon.

The most underappreciated aspect of the FTC’s processes is investigation, for it is here that. the FTC wields incredible power to coerce companies into settling lawsuits rather than liti-.

A basic principle underlying the congressional budget process is the separation between money and policy decisions. 29 For a discussion of these and other reasons for this shift, see, for example, Alan Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process, 3rd Ed. (Washington, DC.

Members of Congress often delegate power to bureaucratic experts, but they fear losing permanent control of the policy. One way Congress has dealt with this problem is to require reauthorization of the program or policy. Cox argues that Congress uses this power selectively, and is more likely to require reauthorization when policy is complex or they do not trust the executive branch. By contrast, reauthorization is less likely to be required when there are large disagreements about policy within Congress. In the process, Cox shows that committees are important independent actors in the legislative process, and that committees with homogenous policy preferences may have an advantage in getting their bills through Congress.