» » Partners In Command

Download Partners In Command fb2

by Joseph Glatthaar
Download Partners In Command fb2
  • Author:
    Joseph Glatthaar
  • ISBN:
  • ISBN13:
  • Genre:
  • Publisher:
    Free Press (October 1, 1998)
  • Pages:
    304 pages
  • Subcategory:
  • Language:
  • FB2 format
    1377 kb
  • ePUB format
    1625 kb
  • DJVU format
    1384 kb
  • Rating:
  • Votes:
  • Formats:
    mobi lrf azw lit

Joseph T. Glatthaar received a . from Ohio Wesleyan University, an . in history from Rice University, and a P. in history from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has taught at the . Army Command and General Staff College, the . Army War College, the .

Joseph T. Military Academy, and the University of Houston. He is currently the Stephenson Distinguished Professor of History and chair of the Curriculum in Peace, War and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Библиографические данные.

Glatthaar makes a strong case for the Confederacy's ultimate defeat being due to the lack of strong command relationships, particular after Stonewall Jackson's death after Chancellorsville

Temporarily out of stock. Glatthaar makes a strong case for the Confederacy's ultimate defeat being due to the lack of strong command relationships, particular after Stonewall Jackson's death after Chancellorsville. Granted, the Confederacy could very well have been doomed from the beginning to to a much lower population and manufacturing base.

Электронная книга "Partners In Command", Joseph Glatthaar. Эту книгу можно прочитать в Google Play Книгах на компьютере, а также на устройствах Android и iOS. Выделяйте текст, добавляйте закладки и делайте заметки, скачав книгу "Partners In Command" для чтения в офлайн-режиме.

Partners In Command - Joseph Glatthaar. This book is about those command relationships. It focuses on how commanders in chief interact with top field generals, and how those officers work with critical subordinates. The study grew out of a course at the . Army War College and focuses on six of those command relationships: Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. Jackson; Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan; Jefferson Davis and Joseph E. Johnston; Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman; Grant and Sherman and David Dixon Porter; and Lincoln and Grant.

Partners In Command book. Or is it? According to Joseph T. Glatthaar’s Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War, command relationships are the bases for effective battlefield executions, but the origins of those relationships also have major impacts when employing resources to win on the battlefield. Glatthaar examines those relationships between commanders in chief and their commanding generals and between individual Union and Confederate generals and their sta It’s all about who you know.

The Relationship Between Leaders in the Civil War. by Joseph T. Glatthaar.

0 5 Author: Joseph Glatthaar. Download books offline, listen to several books continuously, choose stories for your kids, or try out a book that you didn't thought you would like to listen to. Explores the productive friendships of such contrasting personalities as Grant and Sherman and Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, bringing to life the struggle between McClellan and Lincoln and Jefferson Davis and Joseph E. Johnston.

Books related to Partners In Command. More by Joseph Glatthaar. Lens of War. J. Matthew Gallman.

Stephenson Distinguished Professor; Adjunct Professor of the Curriculum in Peace, War and Defense 504 Hamilton Hall 919-962-3974 jtgl. BA Ohio Wesleyan University, 1978 MA Rice University, 1981 PhD University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1983. Glatthaar is the Stephenson Distinguished Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Free Press, 1994), Forgotten Allies: The Oneida Indians in the American Revolution (Hill & Wang, 2007) with James Kirby Martin, General Lee's Army: From Victory To Defeat (The Free Press, 2008), and Soldiering in the Army of Northern Virginia: A Statistical Portrait of the Troops Who Served under Robert E. Lee (University of North Carolina Press, 2011). He is currently President of the Society for Military History.

Explores the productive friendships of such contrasting personalities as Grant and Sherman and Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, bringing to life the struggle between McClellan and Lincoln and Jefferson Davis and Joseph E. Johnston.

The author's insights about the relationships between six major Civil War generals and their commanders-in-chief, as well with as their peers, is extremely valuable. Interesting also, is the partnership that developed between Grant and (Admiral) Porter that developed during the Vicksburg campaign. Great book, highly recommended for any CW collection!
Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command: the relationships between leaders in the Civil War
NYC: Free Press, 1994.
A few photos of profiled leaders. 4 maps. Footnotes. Bibliographic essay. Subject index.

2 Presidents / 6 generals & 1 admiral. 5 dyads / 1 triad, 4 successes / 2 failures, 4 North / 2 South.

Glatthaar “selected these 6 [partnerships] because of the critical effect of each partnership on the success or failure of its armed forces.” “The study concentrates on the operational and strategic levels of war, with particular emphasis on operational art and military strategy.” (p.viii)

BOOK’S THESIS: “How successful … military & political leaders forged partnerships to exploit their resources more effectively … would translate into ultimate success or failure in the war” (p4).

“No longer could a single individual supervise mobilization, oversee policies, plan strategy, administer the forces, and direct field operations. … Political & military leaders had to collaborate, to establish effective partnerships that could translate strategic vision into battlefield execution.” (p.vii)

DEFINITIONS (p.vii-ix & p243 fn#1)
* OPERATIONAL ART: “the use of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theatre of war through the conduct of campaigns or major operations.” -- adapted from U.S. Dept. Army Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, p9. --
* MILITARY STRATEGY: “the art and science of using the armed forces of a nation or alliance to achieve policy objectives by the application of the threat of force.” -- adapted from U.S. Dept. Army Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, p10. --
* NATIONAL STRATEGY: “the art and science of developing and using the political, military, economic, and psychological powers of a nation during peace and war to further national interests, priorities, and policies.”

“The operational level fulfills military strategy, which in turn helps to accomplish national strategy,” i.e. a set of nested strategies.

“STRATEGY … is a composite of
* ENDS (what one hopes to accomplish),
* WAYS (how one hopes to accomplish it), and
* MEANS (with what resources one intends to accomplish it).”

CHAPTER FORMAT: Short biographical profile(s). Uses predominantly primary sources to describe the emergent crucial high command relationships, and analyze command effectiveness within actual operations or campaigns.

Chapter 1 – The Fabric of War, p1-4. A terse, high-level situation assessment of the North & South at the start of the Civil War.
“Just prior to the outbreak of hostilities between the states, the nation boasted a puny defense establishment of 16,000 soldiers and 23 active ships (p2). “the Regular Navy, along with an industrial capacity to expand it readily, could project forces along rivers and coastal areas” (p3). “Although the huge Confederate coastline enabled its mariners to evade the blockade, it served as an avenue of invasion as well” (p3-4), See Weigley, The American Way of War for his discussion on post American Revolution naval policy / strategy.

Chapter 2 – “He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right” Lee, Jackson & Confederate Success in the East, p6-49 & footnotes p243-47.

Chapter 3 – “You have done your best to sacrifice this army” Lincoln, McClelland & Union Failure in the East, p50-93 & footnores p247-52.

Chapter 4 – “I cannot direct both parts of my command at once” Davis, Johnston & Confederate Failure in the West, p94-133 & footnotes p252-56.

Chapter 5 – “If I got in a tight place you would come if alive” Grant, Sherman & Union Success in the West, p134-61 & footnores p256-59.

Chapter 6 – “I am ready to cooperate with anybody and everybody”: Grant, Sherman, Porter and Successful Army-Navy Collaborations, p162-90 & footnotes p260-62.

THE RELATIONSHIPS. “Grant’s quiet confidence, aggressive approach to warfare, and doggedness earned Porter’s deepest admiration. No one Porter ever met could focus on a problem, such as the conquest of Vicksburg, and labor at it so relentlessly as Grant. He attempted scheme after scheme just to gain a position from which to launch an attack”. Sherman & Porter were “both quick-tongued, energetic, extremely intelligent, and wholly devoted to their profession of arms, these two men bonded during their first encounter and within a week they were fast friends.” (p.178)

Grant & Sherman “were unlike in everything except in their skill as soldiers, yet they agreed perfectly. What made the tandem so successful,” Porter concluded, was that “Grant & Sherman together combine qualities possessed by no one general that ever lived; what one wants the other possesses.” (p180 & p262 fn#34)

Sherman led a raid on Meridian, MS, living off the land & destroying railroad tracks. (p183)

[Porter had hit the trifecta for incompetent political generals with McClernand, Banks, & Butler.] As the war closed Porter, letting emotion rule reason, blasted Grant in letters to the Navy Department for his support of incompetent political generals. In 1870, this leaked correspondence delayed and almost derailed Porter’s promotion by President Grant from Vice Admiral to Admiral (p188).

“Sherman & Porter, the ranking officers of their respective services, led the drive toward professionalism in the armed forces” (p189).

Chapter 7 – “I cannot spare this man. He fights.” Lincoln, Grant & Ultimate Success, p190-223 & footnotes p263-67..

Chapter 8 – Partners in Command, p224-36 & footnotes p267-68.
“At the outbreak of hostilities, the Confederates possessed an overwhelming advantage over the Federals among individual leaders. Never before had a wartime president possessed such a broad military & political background as JEFFERSON DAVIS, and a coterie of high-ranking officers – ROBERT E. LEE, JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, & ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON – were touted as the best either side had to offer. Yet over the course of the war, superior military & political leadership emerged among Union ranks … LINCOLN provided the vision and the essential men & materiel, directing mobilization & shielding his officers from the worse hazards of politics so they could concentrate on fighting the war. In an open atmosphere that encouraged the frank interchange of ideas. The commanders thrashed out concepts & strategies, skillfully employed the manpower & equipment at hand, and cooperated fully in execution.” (p225)

“With the preservation of Confederate independence as his objective, DAVIS ADOPTED A MILITARY STRATEGY that called for defense as close to the border as possible. … Yet the Confederacy lacked the resources to protect every point along its mammoth geographic borders. Instead, Davis positioned armies along logical routes of invasion, to deter & repel Union advances and seal off penetrations elsewhere. … He hoped that when Federals launched large-scale offenses, TWO OR MORE ARMIES WOULD CONCENTRATE TO DEFEAT THE ATTACKERS. The weakness in Davis’s plan lay in its inability to defend against simultaneous advances. [for example Atlanta & Richmond] … Partisan warfare on their home ground would expose their sacrosanct property & families to even greater ravages by Yankee invaders.” (p226)

“Davis’s primary drawback stemmed from his personality” (p227).

“Among [ROBERT E.] LEE’S many great qualities was his ability to utilize the strengths & overcome the weaknesses of those around him. He possessed an unusual talent for adapting his own personality to work well with superiors and subordinates, without selling out his designs or compromising his own dignity.” (p227)

“A paucity of bona fide command talent [after the death of Stonewall Jackson & Longstreet’s wounding], as much as anything, undid Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia” (p228).

“With razor-like acuteness, LINCOLN sliced away all the extraneous concerns until only a single, core issue remained: the reunion of the states. … [Lincoln] adapted plans, rotated personnel, endured criticism, mourned losses, & initiated drastic, occasionally revolutionary, policies to fulfill his national strategy. Later, by admitting that slavery was the root cause of the sectional crisis and by seeking its destruction, he elevated emancipation from a military policy to a political objective as well.” “Secure in himself & the direction he designated for the nation, Lincoln adapted his ways to elicit the strengths & compensate for the weaknesses of others.” (p230)

“Together, THE LINCOLN / GRANT TEAM functioned exceedingly well. Lincoln adroitly guided Grant through political minefields, and the new commanding general assumed the mantle for army operations,” “The RAIDING STRATEGY OF GRANT & SHERMAN “suppress[ed] the secessionist spirit in the [Southern] population.” (p232)

“During the course of the war, GRANT FORMED AN IMPRESSIVE ARRAY OF SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIPS. Tough-minded & relentless in battle, Grant reassured those around him with his calm and confident temperament.” “Just as Sherman did for Grant, [DAVID DIXON] PORTER broadened Sherman’s and Grant’s horizons, offering an entirely new perspective from the vantage point of the maritime world. … For Porter, the two shattered the stereotypical mold of army officers and paved the way for true army-navy cooperation.” (p233)

GRANT & SHERMAN “ESTABLISHED AN OPEN HEADQUARTERS, where ranking officers regularly dropped by during day or night, offering suggestions, kicking around ideas, and grappling with problems. This free and frank exchange of viewpoints not only resolved military issues but also served as an outstanding training ground for officers.” (p234)

“Civil War armies were too large, too resilient, and pursuit too difficult to hope for one climatic engagement.” (p235)

“GRANT & SHERMAN THOUGHT ON THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL. Through extended maneuvering and fighting – attempting to gain critical positions that would compel the Confederates to assault them, seeking opportunities to bore holes in enemy lines, or damaging them with flank attacks – they intended to break up their opponent’s army, to deliver a series of blows that would deprive it of its offensive capabilities. … THEY MUST KEEP IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THEIR PREY, in order to prevent the Confederates from assuming the initiative and bar them from sending reinforcements elsewhere.” (p235)

IN SUMMATION. Leaders “had to know themselves, to know their own assets & liabilities as well as the qualities & characteristics of critical subordinates. The also need the capacity to elicit those skills from their underlings. It was imperative for leaders to assemble personnel who complemented rather than supplemented their own capabilities, so that they could draw from a wide range of talents to tap into and employ resources most effectively to meet the increasingly complex demands of the war.” (p236)

“The mere possession of [manpower, industrial might, and a powerful agricultural base] … by no means assured a Union victory. Not until its military & political leaders learned to harness that power and focus it on the enemy’s source of strength … did the war shift decisively in the Union’s favor.” (p236)

“This study grew out of [instructing] a course [Command Relationships in the U.S. Civil War] at the U.S. Army War College” using “a compilation of documents as its text” (p.vii & p269).

A History Book Club Dual Main Selection.
Joseph Glatthaars's book is a useful addition to the body of work on Civil War leadership. His thesis is straightforward (Page vii): "Political and military leaders had to collaborate, to establish effective partnerships that could translate strategic vision into battlefield execution. . . . This book is about those command relationships. It focuses on how commanders in chief interact with top field generals and how those officers work with critical subordinates."

In a sense, this book is about the good, the bad, and the ugly. Some very positive relationships (the good): Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson; Ulysses Grant and William Sherman; Grant, Sherman, and David Porter; Grant and Abraham Lincoln. Some bad and ugly relationships: Lincoln and George McClellan; Jefferson Davis and Joseph Johnston.

The partnerships that worked appear to have facilitated success. Jackson's bizarre behaviors worked well under Lee's leadership. Grant and Sherman worked well together, as they had gown together under adversity. Sherman and Grant were able to collaborate with Porter's navy, to good effect, such as at Vicksburg. Lincoln gave Grant slack when Grant came east that he often did not provide other generals--because of Grant's proven winning record in the west.

On the other hand, the dreadful relationship of Davis and Johnston created serious problems in the west and McClellan's's war of attrition against Lincoln certainly did not help the Union cause in the East.

This represents a useful volume on the subject of command relationships. Not a great deal is new here, but the volume addresses an important issue.